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1 Introduction
Citizens exercise a demand for crime by exposing themselves to the risk of theft and violence
(Becker, 1968). Exposure can be limited by self-protective measures such as keeping valuables
out of sight, avoiding streets at certain times, and installing devices such as burglar alarms.
The supply of crime by oenders has been extensively studied, including studies into the
eect of the threat of punishment on the decision to commit crime. How potential victims
protect themselves against crime has received much less attention. In most empirical studies,
the level of victim precaution is taken as a given.
From an economic perspective, victim responses to crime are important as they add greatly
to the costs of crime to society, with virtually everybody taking some precautionary measures.
In addition, victim precaution may either substitute or enhance public expenditures on crime
control. A hidden radio-transmitter in private vehicles could make retrieval of stolen vehicles
by the police more eective (Ayres and Levitt, 1998). Alternatively, a higher level of police
protection may reduce avoidance behavior of potential victims (Vollaard and Koning, 2009),
which in turn could drive up victimization of crime, as argued by Philipson and Posner (1996).
From a social welfare perspective, potential victims may under-invest in self-protective
measures, since some of the costs of crime are borne by society, including the use of police and
justice resources. Perhaps more importantly, under-investment may result from behavioral
traits such as an inability to commit to a strategy of precautionary behavior and being overly
optimistic about the chance of getting victimized by a burglary. Publicity campaigns, security
surveys of homes and subsidies covering all or part of the costs of installing protective devices
have little if any eect on levels of victim precaution (Barthe, 2006). These ndings are
in line with similar eorts to change health preventive behavior and pension saving (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2009). Policies aimed at stimulating the application of self-protective devices
that do not require a change in behavior of potential victims seem to be most promising,
warranting further analysis of their eectiveness. The case for under-investment is not clear-
cut, however, as victim precaution itself may have negative external eects on the risk of
victimization of other potential victims. If victim precaution merely displaces crime from
protected to unprotected targets, individual precautionary measures may actually be wasteful
from a social welfare perspective (Clotfelter (1978), Shavell (1991)). Thus policies aimed at
stimulating victim precaution may only provide welfare gains when displacement eects are
limited.
In this paper we study the eects of large-scale government intervention in precautionary1 Introduction 3
measures against acquisitive crime. As of 1999, all new-built homes in the Netherlands have
to have high-quality locks and burglary-proof windows and doors. The Building Code was
changed accordingly. Since most homes are built as part of large-scale residential construc-
tion projects, application of the protective measures was uniformly applied to large numbers
of newly built co-located homes, limiting displacement of burglary to directly neighboring
homes.1
The change in the Building Code provides a natural experiment in the regulation of self-
protective measures. The regulation makes application of home security conditional on the
year in which the house is built. The resulting exogenous shock in built-in security allows us to
estimate its eect by comparing victimization of burglary in homes that were built just before
and just after the change in regulation. Using a rich sample of nation-wide micro-data on
victimization of crime, we nd the change in the Building Code to have reduced the burglary
risk in newly built homes by 26 percent. Our ndings suggest that burglars avoid old, less-
protected homes that are located in the direct vicinity of the new, better-protected homes.
The presence of a negative externality on older homes is ambiguous. We nd no evidence for
displacement to other property crimes including theft from cars and bicycle theft.
Our main contribution to the literature is the empirical analysis in which we provide
evidence that large-scale government intervention in victim precaution lowers crime, and
may have both positive and negative eects on older, less-protected targets. The existing
literature on the regulation of built-in security is either descriptive in nature { as in studies
on the eect of regulation of motor vehicle security, including Webb (1994) on the steering
lock and Brown (2004) on the electronic engine immobilizer { or limited to small-scale local
interventions such as Bowers et al. (2004). In addition, the broader literature on the eect of
self-protective measures on victimization tends to ignore simultaneity in the relation between
security measures and crime: subjects that are most at risk are also more likely to take
security measures. In some cases, the resulting estimation bias is so strong that a positive
relation between levels of crime and precautionary measures is found (Tseloni et al., 2004).
For instance, to the best of our knowledge, no study has shown burglar alarms to have an
independent, negative eect on victimization of burglary, with most studies showing a positive
correlation between the burglary risk and the presence of a burglar alarm (compare Weisel,
2004). Notable exceptions to the lack of attention to simultaneity in this literature are Ayres
1 In the Netherlands, some 95 percent of homes are built in batches of twenty or more, with building projects
encompassing some 70 homes on average (CBS, 2009).2 The regulation of built-in security: a natural experiment 4
and Levitt (1998) and the follow-up study Gonzalez (2008) who study the eect of exogenous
variation in the use of a car tracking device.
In our paper, we use micro-level data and adopt a quasi-experimental approach, avoid-
ing methodological discussions related to the results of aggregate crime regressions that are
typical of most of the empirical literature on the use of protective measures (including de-
bates about the benets of guns as protective device, for a discussion see Durlauf, Navarro,
Rivers, 2008). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the
1999 regulation of built-in home security arguing that its introduction can be considered as
a natural experiment. In section 3 we describe our data. Section 4 presents the set-up of our
analysis and section 5 presents our parameter estimates including a wide variety of sensitivity
tests. In section 6 we conduct an analysis of costs and benets of the regulation of built-in
security. Section 7 concludes.
2 The regulation of built-in security: a natural experiment
The regulation of built-in home security came into force on January 1, 1999. As of that date,
home builders could only obtain a building permit if they met the legal requirements for
built-in security. The criteria are spelled out in the law in great detail. Home builders are
obliged to use certied burglary-proof locks and window and door frames. Certied materials
can easily be identied by a hallmark showing two stars. The law prescribes which parts
of the home need to be tted with secured doors and windows, excluding those that cannot
easily be reached by burglars.
We do not directly observe the presence of built-in security in homes. Rather, we infer from
the year of construction of the home which homes have or do not have burglary-proof doors and
windows. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with practitioners suggests that application of
similar security measures prior to the change in regulation was very limited and that building
practices changed in line with the change in regulation. In practice, manufacturers of window
and door locks and frames determine the quality of the materials used, as almost all building
contractors use prefabricated elements. The majority of residential housing development in
the Netherlands constitutes of large scale housing projects in which standardized materials
are used that meet the legal requirements.2
Around the time of the regulatory change, a package of built-in security measures for new
2 Small-shop contractors using non-standard materials may not always be in compliance with the law, but
they constitute only a small part of the market.3 Data 5
homes named Secured by Design (PKVW) became increasingly popular. Some municipalities
urged project developers to adopt the measures - although they did not have the legal means
to enforce their application. Secured by Design exceeds the requirements of the Building Code
1999, by also encompassing burglary-proof garage doors, unobstructed views on parking lots
and no free access to back alleys. We have been provided with address-level data on the
homes with the Secured by Design-certicate, which allows us to disentangle the eect of the
change in the Building Code and this voluntary scheme.
We observe the year of completion of the home rather than the year the building permit
was granted. There is a time lag between the two. Data on time-to-completion of residential
construction projects collected by Statistics Netherlands show that on average it takes two
years to complete a home (CBS, 2009). Assuming full compliance with the law and no
application of similar built-in security prior to the change of the law, gure 1 shows the trend
over time in the share of completed homes with the built-in security prescribed in the new
building regulations. Non-compliance was guaranteed up to construction year 1999, with
only a small minority of the homes completed within one year after receiving the building
permit. For instance, the building permit for a home completed in March 1999 was most
likely granted in 1997, i.e. long before the new regulations were in place. Homes completed
in 2000 could either meet the old or the new regulations. In 2001 most completed homes were
built according to the new regulation. We assume construction year 2001 to be the rst year
in which the new building code was in force.3
Households are assigned to treatment on the basis of the year of construction of the
home they are living in. Assignment occurs through a known and measured deterministic
decision rule. Assuming that households living in homes built shortly before the change in
the Building Code are similar to households living in homes built shortly after the change in
the Building code, the use of built-in security is a natural experiment (Imbens and Lemieux
2008). Therefore, we can evaluate its causal impact by comparing the rate of victimization
of burglary for homes that have been built before and after the regulatory change.
3 Data
We combine data from four dierent sources. Our crime data are from the annual National
Victimization Survey (VMR). Using victimization data rather than police recorded crime
3 In the sensitivity analysis, we investigate how robust our results are to excluding homes completed in 2000
from the sample.3 Data 6
data prevents measurement error in the outcome variable through incomplete reporting and
recording of crime incidents. In addition, the survey includes a host of background character-
istics of respondents both aected and unaected by crime during the period of the analysis.
The VMR is a repeated cross section telephone survey among the Dutch population aged 15
or over. We use all four waves of the VMR, from 2005 to 2008. In the interviews, respondents
are asked about crime incidents experienced in the ve years prior to the interview. Once
victimization over this ve-year period is established, the survey includes more detailed ques-
tions about incidents experienced during the last 12 months, including the exact location at
which the crime took place.
To establish the rate of burglary, we select survey responses relating to completed burglary
with loss of property. Burglary is a relatively rare oence, with the share of households
victimized over the last 12 months ranging from 1 to 1.5 percent. To have sucient variation
in victimization of burglary in our sample, we include experience of victimization over the last
24 months rather than the last 12 months.4 As the survey does not include information on the
location of the crime for incidents experienced more than 12 months prior to the interview,
some burglaries may have been committed at the previous rather than the current address.
The yearly rate of households moving does not exceed 7 percent however, greatly limiting the
number of possibly mismeasured burglaries. In the sensitivity analysis, we show the use of
the 24-months rather than the 12-months time window to only aect the precision and not
the size of the estimated eect.
The second dataset we use is the National Building Register (\Woningregister") which
contains information on the characteristics of the home. Information about the year of com-
pletion of the home is available from January 1, 1993 onwards. Our analysis is based on the
sample of 9,784 respondents who live in a home completed in 1993 or later.
The third dataset we use are administrative data on all addresses of homes that are
certied Secured By Design (PKVW), the aforementioned voluntary security package for new
homes. These data are provided by the CCV, the non-prot organization administering the
certication scheme. Finally, we use information on the type of neighborhood, provided by
the Dutch research institute ABF Research. Neighborhood types are measured at four digit
postcode-level distinguishing between city center, just outside city center, suburb, and outside
city limits.
4 As we use victimization over the last 24 months, we exclude from the sample households living in a home
that was completed less than two years ago. Thus for the 2005 survey, we exclude construction years 2003 and
later; for the 2006 survey, we exclude construction years 2004 and later, and so on.4 Set-up of the analysis 7
The National Victimization Survey also provides information bicycle theft, theft from cars
and acts of vandalism (excluding car vandalism) in the own neighborhood. For these crimes,
we use victimization in the last 12 months rather than the last 24 months as the place of
the incident is only known for incidents that occurred in this smaller time window. Figure
2 shows the evolution of the crime rates in the calendar time period 2005-2008. All types of
victimization of crime have declined during this period, with the strongest drops in bicycle
theft and vandalism.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all homes in the sample that are built in the years
before and after the change in the regulation. As shown, the average burglary rate for homes
built in the period 1993{2000 was 2.15%, while for houses built in the period 2001{2005 this
was 1.61%. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the characteristics of the household, the home
and the neighborhood before and after the change in the Building Code are very similar. The
one exception is the share of Secured by Design-homes, which is 7% before the change in the
Building Code and 29% thereafter. As we will show in the sensitivity analysis, the smooth
change in the use of this voluntary scheme does not bias the estimated eect of the regulatory
change.
4 Set-up of the analysis
As the change in the Building Code has the characteristics of a natural experiment, its eects
can be established by comparing burglary rates before and after the change. Figure 3 shows
the evolution of the average burglary rates by year of construction of the home. Clearly the
burglary rate for homes built according to the new Building Code are lower than the burglary
rate for older homes.
Although Figure 3 suggests that only the change in the building regulations resulted in a
structural break in the rate of burglary by year of construction, other factors may have had an
impact on burglary victimization as well. Other factors may include changes in characteristics
of households, homes and neighborhoods during the period of the analysis. First of all, a
change in household characteristics may have aected burglary rates. If households that
are relatively security-conscious have a preference for homes built after the change in the
Building Code, then the assignment rule is no longer truly orthogonal to the burglary risk of
the home. Security-conscious households may take more self-protective measures than other
households after all. As a result, part of the decline in the burglary risk for homes built under
the new Building Code may be the result of selection eects rather than improved built-in4 Set-up of the analysis 8
security. Nevertheless, selection eects are not very likely since the change in the building
regulations is not widely known and the average citizen is limited in his capacity to assess
the quality and benets of built-in security in the home they are interested to buy. Moreover,
the preference for security of the home may be dominated by other preferences such as the
location of the home and attractiveness of the neighborhood. During the period of analysis,
residential construction was highly restricted, which resulted in a relatively strong increase
in prices of homes in the most desirable regions (mostly in and around major cities such as
Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). Clearly, in a tight housing market where home buyers
have diculty in nding a home in a location that suits their preferences, the quality of built-
in security is less likely to be of major importance. To address possible selection eects, we
include a number of individual household characteristics that may be related to the preference
for security, including the level of education and household composition.
Age of the home may have an independent eect on the burglary rate. Newly-built homes
tend to be occupied by households with very young children and both parents working. The
resulting lack of natural surveillance by occupants may increase the risk of burglary in new
neighborhoods. To prevent an upward estimation bias, we include presence of children aged
14 or below in the household and a number of other household composition characteristics
as control variables. Naturally, age of the home is strongly related to the binary variable
representing the regulatory change, making it dicult to separately identify the eect of both
variables. In the sensitivity analysis, we provide additional results suggesting that excluding
age of the home from the estimation equation does not bias our main parameter estimates.
Changes in characteristics of the home may also have aected rates of burglary. Cohorts
of homes from dierent construction years may dier in ways that aect their risk of burglary
victimization. The share of homes built as part of greeneld developments outside cities
gradually increased during the period of the analysis (see the summary statistics on homes
built in suburbs in Table 1). As homes in suburbs are less likely to be burgled, this trend
could lead us to overestimate the eect of the change in the Building Code. As discussed
earlier, the number of certied Secured by Design homes has increased during the period of
the analysis, which may have reduced the risk of burglary in a similar fashion (see Table 1).
To address such cohort eects, we include a number of observable characteristics of the home,
its occupants and the neighborhood at the cohort level as explanatory variables.
Finally, characteristics of the neighborhood may have aected burglary rates as well.
Public law enforcement may react to the change in the building regulations. Greater levels of5 Parameter estimates 9
protective measures in new-built neighborhoods may induce the police to focus their attention
on older neighborhoods. To prevent estimation bias through this type of osetting behavior,
we include a control variable for the visible presence of police in the own neighborhood.
The equation to be estimated is specied as follows:
Bi;p;t; = t + p + Xi;p;t; + I(  2001) + i;p;t; (1)
where B is a dummy variables which denotes whether or not household i living in province p,
surveyed in year t and living in a home built in year  was a victim of burglary in the 24 months
preceding survey year t. Furthermore, to account for in
uence of calender time changes in
the national burglary rate we include survey year xed eects, t. To account for regional
dierences we include province xed eects p. The X variables represent characteristics of
household, home and neighborhood. The introduction of the new Building Code is represented
by the indicator function I(  2001), hence the parameter  measures the eect of the code
on the burglary rate. Finally  is a vector of parameters and  is an error term. We estimate
the parameters of our linear probability model using OLS.5
5 Parameter estimates
5.1 Baseline model
The rst column of Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for our baseline model. The signs
of the estimated eects of the control variables are as expected. At the household level, we nd
burglary victimization to be positively related to living alone, having children above 14 years
of age, being separated, not being married, living in an expensive owner-occupied home, living
in a single family home with garden (compared to living in an apartment), living just outside
the city center (compared to living outside city limits), not having lots of contact with the
neighbors and seeing the police at least once a week in the own neighborhood. The variable
of interest, the Building Code, has a signicant negative eect on the burglary rate. Taking
the burglary rate prior to construction year 2001, the estimate of -0.56 %-point suggests that
the regulatory change reduced victimization of burglary by 26 percent. Finding an eect of
built-in security is in line with anecdotal evidence about the change in building practices in
5 In our estimates we account for clustering of observations by province. Plans for residential construction
are made at the level of the province, which results in correlation of characteristics across homes built in the
same province.5 Parameter estimates 10
response to the new Building Code, which we discussed in section 2. Apparently, the built-
in security measures were eective in preventing successful burglaries with loss of property.
Since the regulatory change about 650,000 new homes have been built in the Netherlands.
On the basis of our parameter estimates, we conclude that during 2001{2009 almost 10,000
burglaries in these homes were prevented through application of built-in security.6
The estimated eect of the government regulation of 0.56%-point is almost identical to
the unconditional dierence in burglary rates of 0.54%, presented in the rst row Table 1.
The similarity of the conditional and the unconditional estimate supports the assumption
that the government regulation can be considered as a natural experiment. Other potential
determinants of the burglary rate by year of construction of the home change smoothly,
which prevents them from biasing the estimated eect of the regulatory change (cf. Van der
Klaauw 2008). To further establish the robustness of our ndings we present a wide variety
of sensitivity tests in the next section.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
As discussed before, the percentage of homes that are certied Secured by Design gradually
increased during the period of the analysis, aecting the presence of built-in security in homes
within the sample. Figure 4 shows the evolution by year of construction of the share of homes
built under this voluntary scheme. To investigate this source of potential estimation bias, we
exclude all certied Secured by Design homes from the sample. The second column of Table 2
shows that the parameter estimates remain largely unchanged, supporting the argument that
we are able to distinguish the eect of the change in the Building Code from the increased
application of Secured by Design.
As discussed in section 2, construction year 2000 falls within a transition period. The
average time-to-completion is two years, which means that only some homes completed in
2000 may have been built in accordance to Building Code 1999. So far we have assumed
construction year 2000 to fall before the regulatory change. To investigate how sensitive our
results are to this assumption, we exclude homes made in 2000 from the sample. The second
row of Table 3 shows that the estimated eect of the Building Code on burglary rates is
robust to restricting the sample to construction years outside the transition period.
6 Note that homes dier in the number of years that they have been exposed to the risk of burglary. When
computing the number of prevented burglaries by 2009, we take into account the number of years that have
elapsed since the year of completion of the home. We discuss displacement of burglary to older homes and
other types of property crime in response to the regulatory change later in the paper.5 Parameter estimates 11
We use a 13-year time window around the structural break, with eight construction years
before 2001 and ve construction years since 2001. A wider time window allows us to be
more condent about the size of the eect of the regulatory change, but may also introduce
an estimation bias through the presence heterogeneity. Homes built several years earlier or
later than the structural break of 2001 are more likely to be dierent than homes built just
before and after 2001. If these other characteristics aect the treatment and experimental
group dierently, then the estimated eect is likely to be biased. To investigate whether
reducing the sample only aects the precision of the estimated eect rather than the size of
the eect we vary the size of the sample around the threshold. The third to sixth row of
Table 3 show how the estimated eect varies when we reduce the range of construction years
within the sample. Clearly, the imprecision of the parameter estimate increases but the point
estimate is robust to the reduction of the sample size.
Occupants of homes with high levels of built-in security could expose themselves to higher
risks than occupants of homes lacking these security measures (similar to car drivers osetting
the safety provided by air bags by driving more aggressively, as shown in Peterson et al., 1995).
For instance, they could leave valuables in sight when away from home or put o investment in
additional security devices such as burglar alarms. When we include the presence of additional
security measures (shutters, outside light, burglar alarm, extra locks) as potential channels
of osetting behavior in equation (1), the estimated eect of government regulation hardly
changes (the seventh row of Table 3). If osetting behavior would have been strong, then
including these additional security measures would have resulted in a much bigger estimated
eect of government regulation. Thus we nd no evidence that the impact of the regulatory
change is aected by a behavioral response from occupants.
To obtain sucient variation in the rate of burglary by year of construction, we used
victimization over the last 24 months rather than the last 12 months. As discussed before, by
extending the time window to 24 months, we may include some burglaries in the sample that
were committed at the previous address. The eighth row of Table 3 shows that the size of the
eect is exactly half as large when using the 12 months-burglary rate, which means that it is
similar to the baseline estimate. In line with our assumption, using the larger time window
only aects the precision and not the size of the estimated eect of the regulatory change.
The eect of the regulatory change may depend on the type of neighborhood. For instance,
the type of oender may dier between localities, with prolic oenders addicted to drugs
concentrated in the city center. Table 4 shows dierences in victimization of burglary before5 Parameter estimates 12
and after the regulatory change across neighborhood types. Burglaries occur most often in
the city, with the drop in the burglary rate concentrated in neighborhoods just outside the
city center. A similarly sized drop can be seen in homes located outside city limits. The
absence of a comparable drop in the burglary rate for homes in the city center and suburbs
can be explained by a higher rate of attempted burglary for homes built after the regulatory
change in these areas, as also shown in Table 4. Whereas the rate of burglary and attempted
burglary combined declines for homes just outside the city center and outside city limits, this
rate goes up for homes in the city center and in suburbs. Young homes in these areas seem to
be relatively attractive to burglars. The higher level of built-in home security does not prevent
all burglars from attempting a burglary in these homes, as shown in the third column of Table
2, but it is successful in preventing them from entering the home. Apparently, the presence or
the eectiveness of the built-in security is not immediately evident to all burglars. Given the
higher rate of attempted burglary in some areas, the impact of the regulatory change may be
larger than can be inferred from looking at completed burglary with loss of property alone.
When we exclude suburbs { areas with a relatively strong increase in attempted burglary {
the estimated reduction in victimization of burglary increases from 26 to 32 percent, as can
be inferred from row 9 of Table 3.
As discussed in section 4, it is dicult to simultaneously assess the impact of age of the
home and the regulatory change as the two are strongly correlated. Row 10 of Table 3 shows
that when we directly include age of the home in the estimation equation the estimated eect
becomes imprecise and the point estimate increases from -0.56 to -0.70 (the impact of age can
not be estimated precisely either). As discussed above, young homes may be more attractive
to burglars, which may explain why including age in the estimation equation slightly increases
the estimated eect of the regulatory change. We conclude that an evaluation based on the
rate of burglary may present a lower-bound estimate of the overall eect of the regulatory
change.
As a further test of the robustness of our ndings, we investigate whether vandalism in the
own neighborhood (excluding car vandalism) is aected by the introduction of the Building
Code. Clearly, we should not see any eect of the regulatory change on a crime type that
is unrelated to burglary. Figure 5 shows the unconditional means of vandalism by year of
construction of the home. Unlike burglary, vandalism does not show a structural break around
construction year 2001. The estimation results in Table 6 conrm these results. The impact
of the regulatory change works through the increased application of built-in home security,5 Parameter estimates 13
only aecting burglary, and not other crimes. In the next section, we discuss displacement of
burglary to related property crimes such as theft from car.
5.3 Displacement of burglary to older homes
Depending on spillover eects to other homes, the nation-wide eect of the regulatory change
on the number of burglaries may be larger or smaller than the direct eect on newly-built
homes. Oenders may shift their activities to older, less-protected homes, a tactic known
as target displacement. In that case, crime is not prevented but redistributed. Evidence
of displacement to less-protected targets has been found for several built-in security devices
against car theft, including steering locks (Mayhew et al., 1976), electronic engine immo-
bilizers (Brown, 2004) and radio transmitters for retrieval of stolen cars (Gonzalez, 2008).
Alternatively, oenders may avoid older homes if it is not immediately evident which homes
have and which homes do not have the built-in security, negatively aecting the overall returns
to burglary.7
If there is displacement of burglary to homes built before 2001, then the burglary risk
of these homes should be relatively high when they are located in localities with a relatively
large share of well-protected homes. To test for the presence of this displacement eect, we
use information from all 57,422 respondents of the National Victimization Survey living in
homes built before the regulatory change { rather than those respondents living in homes
completed in 1993-2005, the subsample we have used so far. We test whether the burglary
risk for homes built before 2001 increases with a larger neighborhood or municipality share of
homes completed since 2001. Neighborhoods are dened at the four-digit postcode level on
average including close to 3,000 households; a municipality includes on average some 16,000
households.
In the estimation equation we replace the policy variable by the share of homes built since
2001. Our sample includes 1,447 neighborhoods and 439 municipalities. In this sample, the
percentage of homes built since 2001 varies from 0 to almost 100 percent at the level of the
7 Ayres and Levitt (1998) have shown displacement of crime to be limited when protective devices are
not visible to oenders. They nd that both protected and unprotected cars benet from the use of radio-
transmitters for retrieval of stolen vehicles when it is not immediately obvious to car thieves which car has
and which car does not have the device installed. Interestingly, Gonzalez (2008) shows what happens when
the same protective device is visible to car thieves. In Mexico Lojack was exclusively licensed to Ford. Ford
heavily advertised which models had the device installed. Gonzalez nds that the exclusive licensing scheme
reduced theft of protected vehicles but imposed strong negative externalities on unprotected vehicles.5 Parameter estimates 14
neighborhood and from 0 to 31 percent at the level of the municipality. The rst and third
column of Table 5 shows that on average the burglary rates are not aected by the share of
homes built since 2001.
As shown in the second and fourth column of Table 5, there are two separate eects for
burglary in homes built within the city and outside city limits (the estimated eects for homes
in suburbs are all highly imprecise). Older homes outside the city tend to benet from being
located in the direct vicinity of new, well-protected homes. The estimated eect of a relatively
large share of homes built in 2001 or later is positive at both the level of the neighborhood and
the level of the municipality, with the rst eect being statistically signicant. Apparently,
oenders tend to avoid such areas. The eect for homes within the city diers between the
neighborhood and municipality level. Again, in neighborhoods with larger shares of homes
built since 2001 older homes are less likely to be burgled. In the city, burglars seem to shift
their attention to homes in evidently older neighborhoods where the average presence of built-
in security is low. The positive coecient at the municipality level for homes within the city
suggests that older homes in old city-neighborhoods are negatively aected by the improved
security in new homes. However, none of these eects are statistically signicant dierent
from zero.
5.4 Displacement of burglary to other property crime
In response to better security in new-built homes oenders may also shift to other, related
property crimes. The National Victimization Survey provides data on victimization of bicycle
theft and theft from car in the own neighborhood, allowing us to analyze whether these crimes
are more likely to occur around homes that have been built according to the new building
regulations. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with practitioners suggests that displacement
to bicycle theft is most likely, as burglars may have shifted their attention from the home to
the garage, in which often bicycles are parked. Securing garages against theft was not part
of the 1999 Building Code, leaving them relatively unprotected.8
Figure 5 shows the unconditional means of bicycle theft and theft from car by year of
construction of the home. We only include crime incidents in the own neighborhood. In
8 The potentially osetting eect of burglars aiming for the garage rather than the home may be incorporated
in victimization of burglary if survey respondents do not see the two types of incidents as dierent. In that
case, the estimated eect of the regulatory change on burglary is the net eect of burglary in the home and
burglary in the garage. Whether respondents see theft of their bicycle as part of a burglary or not does not
aect our analysis of displacement.6 Benets and costs of regulation 15
contrast to the clear drop in the rate of burglary after construction year 2000, we do not see a
similar structural break for bicycle theft and theft from car. Similar evidence for the absence
of an eect is re
ected in the estimation results for bicycle theft and theft from car presented in
Table 6. We estimate displacement eects of the change in the Building Code by substituting
burglary for theft from car and bicycle theft as dependent variable in the estimation equation.
To address heterogeneity in quality of bicycles, we include the percentage of bicycles insured
against theft. Similarly, we include the percentage of cars with an alarm system installed as
indicator of quality of the car. The estimated coecients for the change in the Building Code
are positive, but not statistically signicant. To conclude, we nd no evidence of displacement
of burglary to other property crimes in the direct vicinity of better-protected homes.
6 Benets and costs of regulation
The costs of regulation related to setting and maintaining building standards are mostly xed.
As some 70,000 homes are built annually, regulation costs per home are small. Municipali-
ties tend to rely on industry standards for building materials rather than inspections of the
home upon completion. The direct costs of installing burglary proof windows and doors are
relatively small. Practitioners estimate these costs to be about 430 euro per home, which
is equal to less than 0.2 percent of the average house price of 240,000 euro. We assume the
small increase in building costs to have had no distortionary eects on the housing market
(for instance building contractors lowering quality of the home on other dimensions than secu-
rity) or on consumer behavior (for instance consumers adjusting their bundle of consumption
goods).
Even with relatively minor costs of regulating built-in security, the benets have to be
substantial to justify the costs. Burglary is a relatively rare crime, with only 1.5 percent
of homes victimized annually at the time of the introduction of the new Building Code. In
other words, on average, a home is burgled every 66 years. The building regulations apply
uniformly to all homes, whereas only some homes are likely to be burgled. Thus reducing
burglary by way of regulation of built-in security is a relatively crude measure. On the other
hand, uniform application increases the social benets of security as it limits displacement of
burglary to neighboring homes.
To estimate the benets of the decrease in burglary victimization, we use a Home Oce
study into the private and social costs of burglary (Home Oce 2005). 9 In this study, the
9 Similar gures on the costs of crime are not available for the Netherlands.7 Conclusions 16
social costs of a burglary are estimated to be 4,700 euro per incident, a third of which are
related to the use of police and justice system resources.10 Based on the estimated impact of
the change of the Building Code, the benets of the reduced burglary risk amount to some
14 euro per home in the rst year. Over a 75 year period - the average life span of residential
buildings - and using a discount rate of 2.5 percent, the total benets amount to 460 euro per
home. A somewhat longer or shorter lifespan of a home hardly aects the total benets, as
benets which are decades away are heavily discounted.
As discussed before, the eect of the new Building Code on older homes can be both
benecial and detrimental, depending on their location in relation to newly-built homes.
We nd positive spillover eects on older homes in the direct vicinity of newly-built homes,
and inconclusive evidence for older homes in old neighborhoods. Leaving these positive and
negative external eects on older homes aside, we nd the regulation to be welfare increasing.
The benets of this one-size-ts-all measure exceed the costs, albeit not by a large margin.
7 Conclusions
In our empirical analysis we nd that regulation of built-in security in homes is highly eec-
tive in reducing victimization of burglary. Through the application of better burglary-proof
windows and doors, the burglary risk in new-built homes has been reduced by 26 percent
compared to homes built in the years prior to the regulatory change. As a result, some
10,000 burglaries have been prevented in homes built since the introduction of the regulatory
change. Our results are robust to various model specications, including the time window
around the structural break, the year the regulatory change went into eect, and changes in
characteristics of households, homes and neighborhoods that coincided with the change in
regulation.
Finding a large eect of the regulatory change implies that households living in homes
built before the change in the regulation took few precautionary measures to compensate for
their lack of built-in security. Apparently, homes with a low level of built-in security remain
vulnerable to the risk of burglary. The inability to commit to a strategy of precautionary
behavior and the tendency to be overly optimistic about the chance of being victimized are
two explanations for low levels of private crime prevention suggested by the related litera-
ture on preventive health behavior (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). In line with this literature,
10 Home Oce (2005) reports costs of crime in British Pounds of 2003. We converted the costs into euro
using the exchange rate of 2003 and correcting for in
ation over the period 2003-2009.7 Conclusions 17
the eectiveness of regulation of built-in security compares favorably to measures aimed at
changing victim behavior, including publicity campaigns, subsidies for expenditures on se-
curity, and in-house security surveys. Clearly, the built-in home security still requires some
eort on the side of potential victims, including closing and locking all doors and windows
that are accessible to burglars. As such, the eectiveness of regulated home security may be
lower than some kinds of regulated car security, including the electronic engine immobilizer
which only requires taking the key out of the ignition (compare Brown, 2004).
The introduction of the Building Code not only aected burglary rates in newly-built
homes. We also nd positive spillover eects on older homes in the direct vicinity of newly-
built homes, which suggests that burglars tend to avoid neighborhoods with relatively many
well-secured homes. We nd no evidence of displacement of burglary to other property crimes.
Leaving spillover eects aside, we nd that the social benets of the regulation exceed the
social costs, even though carelessness of occupants may undermine some the eectiveness of
the security measures and application of the measures is not targeted at homes that are most
at risk.8 References 18
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Tab. 1: Means of variables; 1993{2000, 2001{2005
1993{2000 2001{2005
Victimization of crime (%)
Burglary (last 24 months) 2.15 1.61
Burglary and attempted burglary (last 24 months) 4.32 4.12
Bicycle theft in own neighborhood (last 12 months) 1.83 2.16
Theft from car in own neighborhood (last 12 months) 0.87 1.24
Vandalism in own neighborhood (last 12 months) 3.49 3.43
Household characteristics (0/1)
One-person household 0.13 0.11
No children aged 14 or below 0.62 0.61
Non-western immigrant 0.04 0.06
Low educational attainment 0.26 0.24
Separated 0.05 0.05
Not married 0.28 0.30
Bicycle insurance 0.47 0.46
Car alarm 0.43 0.47
Home characteristics (0/1)
Secured by Design 0.07 0.29
Burglar alarm 0.17 0.17
Shutters 0.16 0.13
Outside light 0.91 0.91
Extra locks 0.91 0.92
Rental property 0.22 0.21
Expensive owner-occupied home 0.14 0.15
Single family home with garden 0.77 0.72
Neighborhood characteristics (0/1)
City center 0.05 0.06
Just outside city center 0.31 0.28
Suburb 0.17 0.23
Outside city limits 0.46 0.43
Lots of contacts with neighbors 0.68 0.71
See police at least once a week 0.24 0.27
Number of observations 6,873 2,9119 Tables and Graphs 22
Tab. 2: Parameter estimates linear probability model { burglary, burglary and
attempted burglary (coecients * 100)
Burglary Burglary { excluding Burglary and
Baseline Secured by Design attempted burglary
Building code -0.56 (0.20)** -0.53 (0.22)** -0.29 (0.40)
Household characteristics
One-person household 1.02 (0.39)** 0.94 (0.48)* 0.58 (0.62)
No children aged 14 or below -0.48 (0.24)* -0.38 (0.23) -0.83 (0.30)**
Non-western immigrant -0.53 (1.4) -0.71 (1.33) 1.82 (2.22)
Low educational attainment -0.11 (0.29) -0.17 (0.36) 0.10 (0.51)
Separated 1.42 (0.65)** 1.50 (0.76)* 1.31 (0.58)**
Not married 0.77 (0.29)** 0.90 (0.35)** 1.67 (0.46)***
Home characteristics
Secured by Design 0.37 (0.25) { 0.17 (0.46)
Rental property 0.32 (0.44) 0.29 (0.54) -0.01 (0.52)
Expensive owner-occupied home 1.49 (0.51)** 1.39 (0.60)** 2.81 (0.63)***
Single-family home with garden 0.97 (0.40)** 1.03 (0.51)* 0.46 (0.49)
Neighborhood characteristics
City center 1.00 (0.73) 1.49 (0.95) 1.82 (1.14)
Just outside city center 1.09 (0.35)*** 1.25 (0.42)** 2.34 (0.56)***
Suburb 0.29 (0.45) 0.16 (0.44) 0.68 (0.53)
Lots of contacts with neighbors -0.33 (0.16)* -0.26 (0.21) -1.04 (0.38)**
See police at least once a week 0.92 (0.35)** 0.67 (0.46) 1.88 (0.48)***
Number of observations 9,784 8,480 9,784
Note: All estimates contain xed eects for province (11) and year of survey (3). Standard errors between parentheses
are clustered by province. *** (**, *) indicates signicance at a 1% (5%, 10%) level.9 Tables and Graphs 23
Tab. 3: Various model specications { eect Building Code on burglary
(coecients * 100)
Model specication Eect Building Code Observations
1. Baseline (construction years 1993 - 2005) -0.56 (0.20)** 9,784
2. Excluding construction year 2000 -0.58 (0.21)** 9,068
3. Construction years 1996 - 2005 -0.55 (0.26)* 7,117
4. Construction years 1997 - 2004 -0.62 (0.36) 5,949
5. Construction years 1998 - 2003 -0.47 (0.52) 4,413
6. Construction years 1999 - 2002 -0.85 (0.50) 2,914
7. Including burglar alarm/shutters/outside light/extra locks -0.55 (0.20)** 9,784
8. Burglary rate last 12 months -0.23 (0.12)* 9,994
9. Excluding suburban areas -0.70 (0.25)** 7,926
10. Including age of the home -0.70 (0.60) 9,784
Note: The parameter estimates of household, home and neighborhood characteristics are not shown; the rst estimate
in this table is identical to the estimate shown in the rst column of Table 2. All estimates contain xed eects for
province (11) and year of survey (3). Standard errors between parentheses are clustered by province. ** (*) indicates
signicance at a 5% (10%) level.9 Tables and Graphs 24
Tab. 4: Victimization of burglary and attempted burglary by area and by year of




City center 2.4 2.3 -0.1
Just outside city center 2.9 1.9 -1.0
Suburbs 1.9 2.0 0.0
Outside city limits 1.7 1.1 -0.6
Average 2.2 1.6 -0.5
b. Burglary and attempted burglary
City center 5.1 5.7 0.6
Just outside city center 6.0 4.9 -1.1
Suburbs 3.7 4.7 1.0
Outside city limits 3.3 3.0 -0.3
Average 4.3 4.1 -0.29 Tables and Graphs 25
Tab. 5: Spillover eects of Building Code 1999 on burglary risk of older homes
in the same neighborhood or the same municipality; linear probability
models (coecients * 100)
Same neighborhood Same municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of homes built since 2001 -1.16 (0.88) { 0.85 (1.62) {
Share of homes built since 2001 * City { -0.79 (1.52) { 4.01 (2.71)
Share of homes built since 2001 * Suburb { 1.05 (1.66) { 1.90 (5.01)
Share of homes built since 2001 * Outside city limits { -2.55 (0.90)** { -2.17 (2.69)
Number of neighborhoods/municipalities 1,447 1,447 439 439
Note: Based on 57,422 observations; see also footnote Table 3.9 Tables and Graphs 26
Tab. 6: Parameter estimates linear probability model { bicycle theft, theft from
car and vandalism (coecients * 100)
Bicycle theft Theft from car Vandalism
Building code 0.33 (0.44) 0.28 (0.24) -0.19 (0.24)
Characteristics household
One-person household 0.44 (0.41) -0.26 (0.18) -0.30 (0.88)
No children aged 14 or below -0.67 (0.22)** 0.24 (0.16) -1.30 (0.30)**
Non-western immigrant 0.37 (0.63) 0.26 (0.58) 1.35 (0.65)*
Low educational attainment -0.39 (0.35) -0.02 (0.28) -1.21 (0.43)**
Separated 0.17 (0.45) 0.29 (0.34) 0.36 (0.68)
Not married 2.25 (0.41)*** 1.00 (0.14)*** 1.16 (0.51)**
Characteristics home
Secured by Design -0.19 (0.30) -0.18 (0.20) 0.07 (0.41)
Rental property -0.12 (0.47) -0.01 (0.32) -0.48 (0.59)
Expensive owner-occupied home 0.48 (0.40) -0.29 (0.21) 0.84 (0.58)
Single-family home with garden -0.44 (0.46) -0.08 (0.22) -0.23 (0.49)
Characteristics neighborhood
City center 2.35 (1.48) 0.00 (0.32) 0.73 (0.60)
Just outside city center 0.99 (0.42)** 0.43 (0.30) 0.54 (0.48)
Suburb 0.11 (0.35) -0.23 (0.17) -0.68 (0.42)
Lots of contacts with neighbors -0.07 (0.51) 0.34 (0.16)** -0.68 (0.25)**
See police at least once a week 0.77 (0.37)* 0.35 (0.40) 0.19 (0.51)
Bicycle insurance -0.37 (0.28) { {
Car alarm { 0.99 (0.28)*** {
Note: based on 10,020 observations; see also footnote Table 2.9 Tables and Graphs 27
Fig. 1: Share of new-built homes meeting the 1999 Building Code (%)
   
Completed homes
 not meeting the new  
regulations
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Note: Based on time-to-completion statistics for residential construction.
Source: CBS (2009)9 Tables and Graphs 28






































Burglary Bicyle theft Theft from car Vandalism
Note: Burglary in past 24 months; bicycle theft, theft from car and vandalism in past 12
months.9 Tables and Graphs 29
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